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I. INTRODUCTION
The past year' saw a number of interesting and innovative developments in Florida's professional responsibility jurisprudence. This article
reviews significant Florida court decisions, ethics rules, and advisory ethics
opinions handed down during the year that are likely to affect Florida
lawyers as they attempt to represent their clients zealously while complying
with the letter, if not always the spirit, of the FloridaRules of Professional
Conduct ("RPC").2
Today's lawyer may act in many different capacities, at times assuming
the role of advocate, advisor, counselor, fiduciary, intermediary, businessperson, or marketer. The lawyer must adhere to a host of sometimes* Florida Bar Ethics Director. B.S., Florida State University, 1977; J.D., University
of Texas at Austin, 1984. Member, Florida and Texas bars. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Kelly J. Wright and Kimberly A. Sessions.
1. This article surveys professional responsibility developments in Florida from July 15,
1994, through July 14, 1995.
2. The RPC are found in Chapter 4, Rules Regulating The FloridaBar. Although the

bulk of this article focuses on decisions concerning the RPC, it does mention an important
addition to Chapter 3, "Rules of Discipline," in the Rules Regulating The FloridaBar. See
infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
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overlapping ethical obligations while operating within the framework of
these varied relationships. Using a functional approach, this article analyzes
effects that the cited authorities may have upon a lawyer's ethical duties in
several key relationships. After this introduction, Part II begins by looking
at some professional responsibility developments that can affect the lawyerclient relationship.
Specific areas reviewed include client identity,
communication with clients, business transactions with clients, and fees.
Next, Part III focuses on a lawyer's role as an officer of the justice system
and his or her relationships with, and duties to, that system. Part IV then
examines ethical duties attendant to a lawyer's relationships with various
third parties: prospective clients; opponents; other lawyers; and partners,
employers, and employees. Finally, Part V covers developments relevant to
the lawyer's relationship with the Supreme Court of Florida, The Florida
Bar, and Florida's lawyer disciplinary system, and reviews some significant
disciplinary cases handed down in the past year.3

II. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAWYER-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP
Most observers would agree that, of the many professional relationships
in which a lawyer may be engaged, the relationship between client and
lawyer remains paramount. In 1995 a number of cases, rules, and ethics
opinions addressed aspects of this most important relationship. Before a
lawyer can determine the substantive duties owed to a client by virtue of the
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer must first be certain that he or she has
accurately identified the client. While one might assume that it is unnecessary to even address this basic point, a surprising number of callers to the
Florida Bar's "ethics hotline" 4 present scenarios that boil down to this
essential question: "Who is my client?" Echoing this theme, several 1995
court decisions revolved around client identity issues.

3. Key disciplinary cases are analyzed where appropriate in other sections of the article,
but the remainder are collected in Part V for the convenience of the reader.
4. Since 1985, the Ethics Department of the Florida Bar has operated a toll-free
telephone "hotline" for bar members. A Florida lawyer may call the Bar's Tallahassee office
at 1-800-235-8619 and obtain an informal oral advisory opinion concerning the calling
lawyer's own contemplated conduct. In 1995, Ethics Department lawyers answered about
17,000 calls. Timothy P. Chinaris (1995) (unpublished statistics on file with author,
Tallahassee, Florida). Rules governing the advisory opinion process are found in FloridaBar
Proceduresfor Ruling on Questions of Ethics, FLA. B.J., Sept. 1994, at 652-53. During his
tenure with the Bar, the author has talked to hundreds of lawyers facing client identity
dilemmas.
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Brennan v. Ruffner' concerned a legal malpractice suit brought by Dr.
Brennan, a disgruntled minority shareholder of a closely held corporation,
against lawyer Ruffner. Brennan had practiced in a three-doctor medical
group operated as a professional service corporation. Ruffner had prepared
the shareholder's agreement. Several years later, Brennan was ousted from
the corporation by the other two shareholders. In suing the others for
breach of contract and fraud, Brennan alleged that he had not been
represented by couinsel in negotiating the shareholder's agreement. After
settling that suit, however, Brennan then sued Ruffner for legal malpractice,
alleging that Ruffner had represented both him individually and the
corporation.
Ruffner defended by denying the existence of a lawyer-client relationThe undisputed facts showed that Ruffner had
ship with Brennan.'
represented the corporation and that there had been no privity of contract
between Brennan and Ruffner.7 Nevertheless, Brennan argued that Ruffner
owed a duty to him as a shareholder by virtue of Ruffner's representation
of the closely held corporation. Rejecting this contention, the court stated:
[W]e hold that where an attorney represents a closely held corporation,
the attorney is not in privity with and therefore owes no separate duty
of diligence and care to an individual shareholder absent special
circumstances or an agreement to also represent the shareholder
[A]n attorney representing a corporation does not
individually ....
become the attorney for the individual stockholders merely because the
attorney's actions on behalf of the corporation may also benefit the
stockholders.8
It may be noted that, although RPC 4-1.13(a) 9 expresses the client

5. 640 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

6. The three elements to a legal malpractice action in Florida are: the lawyer's
employment; the lawyer's neglect of a reasonable duty; and that the lawyer's breach of that
duty was the proximate cause of damages suffered by the plaintiff. Riccio v. Stein, 559 So.
2d 1207 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 567 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1990).
7. Brennan, 640 So. 2d at 145.
8. Id. at 145-46.

9. RPC 4-1.13, "Organization as Client," provides in pertinent part:
(a) Representation of Organization. A lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents.
(d) Identification of Client. In dealing with an organization's directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents, a lawyer shall
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identity principle actually applied in the case, the court did not cite this rule
in reaching its decision. Under RPC 4-1.13(a), the client of a lawyer who
represents an organization is deemed to be the entity rather than the entity's
individual constituents (e.g., officers, directors, shareholders).
Client identity was also determinative in the disciplinary case of
FloridaBar v. Nesmith.'° In Nesmith, a lawyer borrowed money from the
owner of a corporation that the lawyer was representing. The lawyer did not
comply with the provisions of RPC 4-1.8(a)," which govern lawyer-client
business transactions. The supreme court, however, found the lawyer not
guilty of unethical conduct because the loan was entered into by the owner
in his individual capacity.' 2 Without citing RPC 4-1.13, the court appeared
to strictly apply the rule's basic principle (i.e., that the lawyer represents the
entity rather than its individual constituents). Some courts in other
jurisdictions have been reluctant to automatically apply the general rule of
RPC 4-1.13(a) in representations involving closely held corporations.' 3
explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's
interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is
dealing.
(e) Representing Directors, Officers, Employees, Members, Shareholders, or
Other Constituents of Organization. A lawyer representing an organization may
also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders,
or other constituents, subject to the provisions of rule 4-1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by rule 4-1.7, the consent
shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the
individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.13.
10. 642 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1994).
11. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.8, "Conflict of Interest; Prohibited Transactions,"
provides:
(a) Business Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse to Client. A
lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse
to a client, except a lien granted by law to secure a lawyer's fee or expenses,
unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are
fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing
to the client in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.8(a).
12. Nesmith, 642 So. 2d at 1359.
13. See, e.g., Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re
Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655, 657 (Or. 1979); In re Banks, 584 P.2d 284, 289-90 (Or. 1978);
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These courts instead have examined the underlying circumstances, including
the reasonable expectations of the entity's constituents regarding the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship. In Nesmith, the Supreme Court of
Florida did not adopt this more expansive approach to client identity in
representations involving closely held corporations.
RPC 4-1.13(a) was directly addressed and applied, however, by the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Hilton v.
BarnettBanks, Inc. 4 In Hilton, a Florida law firm represented one Barnett
entity ("Barnett Pinellas") in one matter, then sued the Barnett holding
company (Barnett Pinellas' parent) and some of the holding company's other
subsidiaries in an unrelated matter. Responding to a motion to disqualify,
the firm asserted that, under RPC 4-1.13, the defendants were not its
"clients." The court agreed with the firm's RPC 4-1.13 analysis, but
disqualified the firm due to conflict of interest reasons because the firm's
pleadings sought relief against the holding company's affiliated banks and
other subsidiaries (which, of course, included Barnett Pinellas).15
After identifying one's client, a lawyer must be mindful that it is the
client, rather than the lawyer, who sets the ultimate objectives of the
representation. The disciplinary case of FloridaBar v. Giant16 underscored
this precept, which is codified in RPC 4-1.2(a). 7 In Glant, the supreme
court reprimanded a lawyer who, without the client's authority or knowledge, filed a motion requesting that the client be given custody of four
children when the client wanted custody of only two of the children, and
wrote to a state agency and the governor requesting that the case be
investigated."8

Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200-01 (Utah 1985).
14. No. 94-1036CIV-T24(A), 1994 WL 776971, (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 1994).

15. Id at *3-4.
16. 645 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1994).
17. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.2, "Scope of Representation," provides:
(a) Lawyer to Abide by Client's Decisions. A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to subdivisions (c),
(d), and (e), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are
to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to make or
accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall
abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to
be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether the client will testify.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2(a).
18. Giant, 645 So. 2d at 965.
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Communication is a primary aspect of the lawyer-client relationship, as
recognized in RPC 4-1.4.19 The crucial importance of unfettered lawyerclient communication, however, was not properly acknowledged by the court
in Taylor v. Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A.2 ° In
Searcy, a lawyer left a law firm, and some clients who had substantial
contingent fee cases wished to follow him. The lawyer and the firm
wrestled over several attractive cases, and a trial court granted the firm's
motion to enjoin the lawyer from "communicating with persons alleged to
be clients of the firm."2 After the lawyer engaged in some prohibited
communication, the trial court found him guilty of civil contempt and fined
him $1,700,000 for violating the injunction.2 2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, setting
aside the finding of contempt and the fine on a procedural ground.23 The
court went on to emphasize that the $1,700,000 fine was excessive. Citing
to two disciplinary cases,24 the majority viewed the large fine as a penalty
that could preclude the client from effectively exercising her right to choose
her own counsel.2 Such a penalty would clearly violate public policy in
Florida.2 6 Senior Judge Mager, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
was quite disturbed that the majority failed to decide the case based on the
injunction's detrimental impact on "the fundamental first amendment right
of an individual to communicate with the attorney of that individual's
choice, whether it be'for the purposes of retention, continued representation,

19. RPC 4-1.4, "Communication," provides:
(a) Informing Client of Status of Representation. A lawyer shall keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.
(b) Duty to Explain Matters to Client. A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.4.

20. 651 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
21. Id. at 100.
22. Id. at 98.
23. Id. at 99. The appeals court noted that the contempt hearing had been held after a
motion to substitute the lawyer for the firm in the case had been granted. Consequently, at
that point "the injunction was no longer effective and thus the purpose of the motion could
only have been punitive ... .- Id. at 98. The trial court therefore should have treated the
matter as one of indirect criminal contempt, rather than civil contempt.
24. Florida Bar v. Hollander, 607 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1992); Florida Bar v. Doe, 550 So.
2d 1111 (Fla. 1989).
25. Searcy, 651 So. 2d at 99.
26. Id.
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or termination."'27 He insisted that an injunction purporting to bar communications of the type at issue in the case was simply beyond the power and
authority of the court.28
In 1995, the Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee also ventured
into the area of lawyer-client communication in the context of lawyers
leaving firms. At issue in Florida Ethics Opinion 93-429 was the ethical
propriety of an employment agreement between a law firm and one of its
associates. The employment agreement prohibited the departing associate
from "seeking, directly or indirectly, any of the [firm]'s clients." The
committee decided, and the Bar's Board of Governors agreed, that this
prohibition on "indirect" solicitation would be unethical if it could be read
to limit a lawyer's duty, imposed by RPC 4-1.4,30 to notify clients of the
lawyer's departure from the firm.3'
The client-lawyer relationship is a fiduciary one of trust and confidence,
and for this reason lawyers must follow special rules when they undertake
to transact business with their clients. The ethical standards applicable in
this area are set forth in RPC 4-1.8(a). 2 In Florida Bar v. Reed,33 the
supreme court reprimanded a lawyer who became embroiled in a real estate
transaction gone awry and did not follow RPC 4-1.8(a). The lawyer acted
as the buyers' lawyer and realtor, represented the sellers to a limited extent,
acted as closing agent, and served as escrow agent. Problems arose,
including bounced checks and trust accounting problems. The court
imposed a six-month suspension, frowning on the lawyer's multiple
representation and failure to follow the business transaction rule.34
Even absent evidence of client harm, failure to follow RPC 4-1.8(a)
when transacting business dealings with clients can result in discipline. In

27. Searcy, 651 So. 2d at 103 (Mager, S.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. Id. at 106.
29. FLA. B. NEws, Mar. 1, 1995, at 21. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 19.

31. FLA. B. NEWS, Mar. 1, 1995, at 21.
32. See supra note 11. Florida case law also imposes requirements upon lawyer-client
business transactions. See, e.g., Jordan v. Growney, 416 So. 2d 24, 25 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (noting that "an attorney who self-deals with a client must demonstrate that the
transaction was as beneficial to the client as if conducted at arm's length between strangers");
Abstract & Title Corp. of Fla. v. Cochran, 414 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(noting that, when challenged, the burden is on the lawyer to show, by clear and convincing
evidence, the fairness of the transaction).
33. 644 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1994).
34. Id. at 1358.
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FloridaBar v. Rue,35 a lawyer was found guilty of selling automobiles to
36
clients without the written disclosures and consents required by the rule.
A related issue concerns a lawyer's provision of financial assistance to
clients during the course of representation. Traditionally, the rules of ethics,
as well as the legal doctrines of champerty and maintenance, have permitted
lawyers to assist clients financially only by advancing costs or expenses of
the litigation itself; payment of, or even advancement of, non-litigation
expenses has been strictly prohibited. This standard is expressed today in
RPC 4-1.8(e). 37 The supreme court, however, in the disciplinary case of
Florida Bar v. Taylor,38 appears to have carved out a limited "humanitarian" exception to this time-honored prohibition. In this case, the lawyer and
his firm provided an apparently needy client with some used clothing and
a $200 check, drawn on the firm's account, for basic necessities. The
referee39 assigned to the disciplinary case found the lawyer not guilty of
violating RPC 4-1.8(e), and the supreme court accepted this finding.40 The
court emphasized that this financial assistance was "essentially an act of
humanitarianism," was not given to induce the client to hire the lawyer or
continue the representation, and that there was no "expectation of repayment" on the part of the lawyer.4 1
Although the court was placed in a very difficult position because of
the facts involved, Taylor seems to be based on unrealistic assumptions and
presents a strained application of the ethics rules. First, once a humanitarianism exception to RPC 4-1.8(e) has been recognized, it will inexorably
expand. If $200 was a permissible gift, how about $500, or $1000?
Furthermore, the Taylor court stressed that the gifts in question were not
35. 643 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1994).
36. Id. at 1081-82.
37. Subdivision (e) of RPC 4-1.8, "Conflict of Interest; Prohibited Transactions,"
provides:
(e) Financial Assistance to Client. A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except
that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and
expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.8(e).
38. 648 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1994).
39. The Supreme Court of Florida appoints a county or circuit judge to sit as "referee"
in the trial of disciplinary cases. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.6(a).
40. Taylor, 648 So. 2d at 1191-92.
41. Id. at 1192.
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made for the purpose of establishing or maintaining the lawyer's employment.42 Perhaps that was true for the initial payment, but human nature
teaches that a client who has received one such gift may expect more. At
the very least, the recipient is likely to tell others of her good fortune and
thus create expectations in the minds of those potential clients-expectations
that, to those persons, may act as an inducement to hire that lawyer.
Finally, there is no basis in RPC 4-1.8(e) for carving out a "humanitarian"
exception. A more forthright, and easier approach to apply would be to
change the rule to spell out the precise boundaries of the exception.
Overlooking the plain language of the rule merely breeds disrespect for this
and other rules.
While the court did not apply RPC 4-1.8(e) to bar the gift in Taylor,
it is clear that advances of living expenses are still considered unethical. In
Florida Bar v. Rue,43 a lawyer received a ninety-one day suspension for
this and other misconduct. 44
In the lawyer-client relationship, few areas are of greater interest to
both sides than the matter of fees. The supreme court resolved a conflict
among district courts of appeal by announcing the proper standard to be
used for determining the quantum meruit recovery of a lawyer discharged
without cause prior to resolution of a client's contingent fee case. In
Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. Polet, 45 the court
held that the "lodestar" method 46 of calculating fees should not be applied
in this context.47 The "lodestar" method is to be used in cases where the
fee will be paid by someone other than the client who received the services.
This method is deficient for determining the quantum meruit award to be
paid to the discharged lawyer by the client (or contracting party), because,
in contravention of Rosenberg v. Levin,48 it does not allow for consideration
of "the totality of the circumstances."49 All relevant factors, including

42. Id.
43. 643 So. 2d at 1080.
44. Id. at 1083. The lawyer was found guilty of: "sharing fees with non-lawyers;
providing [improper] financial assistance to clients; engaging in business transactions with
clients without the required disclosures; and seeking and collecting prohibited fees." Id. at
1082.
45. 652 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1995).
46. See Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), as
modified by Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990).
47. Poletz, 652 So. 2d at 368.
48. 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982).
49. See id. at 1022.
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those set forth in RPC 4-1.5(b), 50 must be considered by the court in fixing
the actual value of the services rendered to the client. The supreme court
identified the following as examples of additional factors that could be
considered by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion: "the fee
[agreement] itself, the reason the attorney was discharged, actions taken by
the lawyer or client before or after discharge, and the benefit actually
conferred on the client."'" In a footnote, the supreme court expressly
recognized that the refusal of a discharged lawyer or law firm to make its
file available to successor counsel could affect the valuation of the
discharged lawyer's services.52 Poletz is significant because it sends a
message to trial courts that a quantum meruit determination should be based
on the totality of the relevant circumstances in each case, not simply a
mechanistic application of an hours-based formula.
In the disciplinary arena, the court in Rue5 3 reiterated its position,
earlier expressed in cases such as Florida Bar v. Gentry, 4 that the rule

50. Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-1.5, "Fees for Legal Services," provides:
(b) Factors to Be Considered in Determining Reasonable Fee. Factors to be
considered as guides in determining a reasonable fee include:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty, complexity, and difficulty of
the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged in the locality for legal
services of a comparable or similar nature;
(4) the significance of, or amount involved in, the subject matter of the
representation, the responsibility involved in the representation, and the results
obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances and,
as between attorney and client, any additional or special time demands or
requests of the attorney by the client;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, diligence, and ability of the lawyer or
lawyers performing the service and the skill, expertise, or efficiency of effort
reflected in the actual providing of such services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, and, if fixed as to amount or
rate, then whether the client's ability to pay rested to any significant degree on
the outcome of the representation.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(b).
51. Poletz, 652 So. 2d at 369.
52. Id. at 369 n.5.
53. See text accompanying notes 35, 43-44.
54. 475 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. 1985).
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against excessive fees55 will be strictly applied when lawyers charge for
recovery of personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits in accident cases.
Applicability of the lawyer-client confidentiality rule 56 to lawyers'
trust accounting records was again recognized by the Professional Ethics
Committee in Florida Ethics Opinion 93-5.57 Consistent with its prior

55. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.5, "Fees for Legal Services," provides:
(a) Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly Excessive Fees. An attorney shall not enter
into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly
excessive fee or a fee generated by employment that was obtained through
advertising or solicitation not in compliance with the Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar. A fee is clearly excessive when:
(1) after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left
with a definite and firm conviction that the fee exceeds a reasonable fee for
services provided to such a degree as to constitute clear overreaching or an
unconscionable demand by the attorney; or
(2) the fee is sought or secured by the attorney by means of intentional
misrepresentation or fraud upon the client, a nonclient party, or any court, as to
either entitlement to, or amount of, the fee.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(a).
56. RPC 4-1.6, "Confidentiality of Information," provides:
(a) Consent Required to Reveal Information. A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client except as stated in subdivisions
(b), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after disclosure to the client.
(b) When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A lawyer shall reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
(c) When Lawyer May Reveal Information. A lawyer may reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to serve the client's interest unless it is information the client
specifically requires not to be disclosed;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and client;
(3) to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved;
(4) to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(5) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(d) Exhaustion of Appellate Remedies. When required by a tribunal to reveal
such information, a lawyer may first exhaust all appellate remedies.
(e) Limitation on Amount of Disclosure. When disclosure is mandated or
permitted, the lawyer shall disclose no more information than is required to meet
the requirements or accomplish the purposes of this rule.
Id. 4-1.6.
57. FLA. B. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1994, at 40.
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opinions,58 the committee concluded that a lawyer "who is an agent for a
title insurance company may not permit the title insurer to audit the
attorney's general trust account without consent of the affected clients."5 9
The opinion went on to state, however, that the "attorney . . . need not
obtain client consent before permitting the insurer to audit a special trust
account used exclusively for transactions in which the attorney acts as the
title or real estate settlement agent."60 Authorization for permitting access
to the records of this special trust account was found in subdivision (c)(1)
of RPC 4-1.6, which allows a lawyer to disclose confidential information "to
serve the client's interest unless it is information the client specifically
requires not to be disclosed.'
Finally, Florida Bar v. Niles62 underscored the importance of trust in
the lawyer-client relationship. There, a lawyer represented a defendant in
a high-profile murder case. The lawyer, unbeknownst to the client, was paid
$5000 by a television program to arrange for a videotaped interview with
the incarcerated client. The lawyer used deception to secure admittance of
himself and the camera crew to the prison. An incriminating interview was
obtained-and broadcast-without the client's authorization. The supreme
court reluctantly accepted the referee's recommendation that the lawyer be
suspended for just one year, but stated that its decision "is not to be read as
an indication that similar conduct will receive any discipline less than
63
disbarment.
III. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE TRIAL SETTING
A lawyer's duty to zealously represent clients is not unrestrained. A
lawyer is an officer of the court, and this relationship of the lawyer to the
justice system imposes certain obligations and constraints upon the lawyer's
advocacy, particularly in the trial setting. Perhaps the paramount duty owed
to the justice system is that of candor toward the tribunal. False or
misleading statements by a lawyer to a court undermine the integrity of the
entire legal system and are dealt with harshly when discovered. For
example, in Florida Bar v. Kleinfeld,64 a forum-shopping lawyer was
suspended for three years and placed on probation for another two years as
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See Fla. Ethics Op. 72-3; see also Fla. Ethics Op. 77-25, 62-24.
Fla. Ethics Op. 93-5, FLA. B. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1994, at 40.
Id.
Id.
644 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1994).
Id. at 507.
648 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1994).
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a result of falsely alleging in a sworn motion to disqualify a judge that the
judge had threatened and attempted to intimidate her counsel.65
Motions to disqualify lawyers from representing their clients at trial
remained popular in 1995. On a procedural note, in Arthur v. Gibson6 6 the
Fifth District Court of Appeal made it clear that a trial court must conduct
a hearing before ruling on such a motion.67
Turning to the substantive issues, most of the reported lawyer
disqualification cases were filed in connection with the "lawyer-as-witness
rule," RPC 4-3.7. 68 In Swensen's Ice Cream Co. v. Voto, Inc., 69 the
appellate court quashed a trial court's order disqualifying a lawyer and his
firm from representing their client, Swensen' S.70 The lawyer had been
hired by Swensen's in a prior matter to help an assignee of a Swensen's
franchise in a dispute with the assignor. The lawyer wrote two letters
stating that the assignor had breached the franchise agreement. In the
present case, the lawyer and his firm represented Swensen's in a separate
matter in which Swensen's was adverse to the assignee. The assignee
moved to disqualify the lawyer and his firm, alleging that the lawyer would
be called as a witness due to his involvement in the prior suit. The trial
court granted the motion.

Id. at 701.
654 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 984.
RPC 4-3.7, "Lawyer as Witness," provides:
(a) When Lawyer May Testify. A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness on behalf of the client
except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no
reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the
testimony;
(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered
in the case; or
(4) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client.
(b) Other Members of Law Firm as Witnesses. A lawyer may act as advocate
in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as
a witness unless precluded from doing so by rule 4-1.7 or 4-1.9 [concerning
conflicts of interest].

65.
66.
67.
68.

R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.7.

69. 652 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
70. Id.
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Reversing the order of disqualification, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal carefully analyzed each element of RPC 4-3.7. Because subdivision
(a) of the rule disqualified only a trial advocate who will also be a
"necessary witness on behalf of' a client, the court pointed out that the
lawyer "will not be testifying either against or on behalf of Swensen's. '' 7I
The two letters (and any testimony from the lawyer concerning them) were
not necessarily material to Swensen's case, nor would they prejudice it.
Moreover, the court stated that any factual information possessed by the
lawyer was also known to the assignee's principals with whom the lawyer
72
had dealt. Thus, the lawyer's testimony "would be cumulative at best."
In short, the movant failed to show that the lawyer would be a necessary
witness on his client's behalf. 73 Nor did the assignee show that the
lawyer's testimony would be adverse to his client's position. Finally, citing
subdivision (b) of RPC 4-1.7, the court noted that the disqualification
imposed by subdivision (a) of the rule is a personal one-it can extend
beyond a testifying lawyer to reach the lawyer's law firm only if the lawyer
was disqualified because his or her testimony was adverse to, and thus in
conflict with, the client's interests.74
In City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 75 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal again relied upon RPC 4-3.7(b) in ruling that a trial
court departed from the essential requirements of law by disqualifying an
entire law firm where only one lawyer in the firm was to be called as a

71. Id. at 962.
72. Id. Florida case law and ethics opinions have long held that the "lawyer-as-witness
rule" is not to be used by opposing counsel as a tactical weapon when a lawyer's testimony
would be immaterial or cumulative. See, e.g., Devins v. Peitzer, 622 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Arcara v. Philip M. Warren, P.A., 574 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991); Banco de Comercio v. Sun Banks, Inc., 488 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1986); Williams v. Wood, 475 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Cazares v. Church
of Scientology of Cal., Inc. 429 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 438 So.
2d 831 (Fla. 1983); Hill v. Douglass, 248 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971), quashed
on other grounds, 271 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972); see also Fla. Ethics Op. 74-36, 72-2, 64-39.
73. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. English, 588 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
74. Swenson's, 652 So. 2d at 962; see In re Estate of Gory, 570 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990). This concept of a testimonial disqualification being personal to the
lawyer and not imputed to the lawyer's firm was first adopted when the RPC superseded the
old Code of ProfessionalResponsibility effective January 1, 1987. Under the prior Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility, a testimonial disqualification did extend to the testifying lawyer's
firm. Calls to the Florida Bar ethics "hotline" indicate that many Florida lawyers and judges
remain unaware of this substantial change in the "lawyer-as-witness rule."
75. 654 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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witness and there was no showing
that the lawyer's testimony would be
76
adverse to the client's position.
An interesting case concerning application of RPC 4-3.7 when a lawyer
is a party to the suit was Springtree Country Club Plaza, Ltd. v. Blaut.7
The lawyer represented his wife in a slip and fall action, and represented
himself on the accompanying loss of consortium claim. Reversing the lower
court's denial of a motion to disqualify the lawyer and his firm, the
appellate court stated that the lawyer's position as a party in interest, as well
as a party seeking damages, "could constitute a violation of Rule 4-3.7.
In view of fhe RPC 4-3.7 problem, as well as the fact that the lawyer's
partner had previously formed the opponent's partnership, the trial court was
directed to disqualify the lawyer and his firm from any representation in the
case.

79

Kusch v. Ballard" was a disqualification case concerning the difficult
and controversial issue of inadvertent disclosure of confidential documents
in litigation. A defendant's lawyer prepared a letter addressed to his client.
The lawyer's secretary, however, inadvertently faxed the document to
plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff's counsel began reading the letter, realized that
it had been mistakenly transmitted to him, and returned it to defense
counsel. Plaintiffs counsel then sought production of the document,
alleging waiver of any privilege. Defense counsel responded by moving to
disqualify plaintiff's counsel. The trial court determined that the document
was privileged, that the privilege had not been waived, and that, apparently
on the authority of General Accident Insurance Co. v. Borg-Warner
Acceptance Corp.,81 lawyers for both plaintiff and defendant must be
disqualified.82 Predictably, writs for certiorari followed. 3
The Fourth District Court of Appeal rendered its decision in a onesentence per curiam reversal of the trial court's order.8 4 What is most
notable about this case is the fact that all three of the judges on the panel
wrote an opinion.85 This exemplifies the depth of disagreement over how
76. Id. at 646.
77. 642 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
78. Id at 28.

79. Il
80. 645 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
81. 483 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
82. Kusch, 645 So. 2d at 1038.
83. Id. at 1035.
84. See id
85. Judge Glickstein concurred specially, Judge Farmer concurred, and Judge Stevenson
concurred in part and dissented in part.

Nova Law Review

Vol. 20

to handle the inadvertent disclosure problem, 6 which undoubtedly will be
occurring more frequently due to fax machines, e-mail, and other new forms
of transmitting information. The only certainty in this area is that more
litigation can be expected.
One development to which trial lawyers must take heed is the trend
toward strict enforcement of rules against improper jury argument.
Appellate courts, particularly the Fourth District Court of Appeal, seem
more inclined to handle egregious violations by reversal-sometimes even
in the absence of objections.
Relying on RPC 4-3.4(e),87 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed based on improper argument in Bellsouth Human Resources v.
Colatarci.8 8 The court's forceful opinion was intended to send a message
to both lawyers and trial judges. 89 Arguments that violated RPC 4-3.4(e)
included statements by counsel regarding "[w]hat other lawyers have done,
what has occurred in other law suits, and what other corporations have
done.

' 90

The Fourth District Court of Appeal again reversed a case on the basis
of grounds that included argument outside the bounds of RPC 4-3.4(e) in
Dutcher v. Allstate Insurance Co.91 Trial counsel had disparagingly
commented regarding his personal opinion of chiropractors and made a

86. The Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee intensely debated the inadvertent
disclosure issue at its meetings for over a year, but simply could not agree on the ethically
proper course of conduct to be followed. Finally the committee issued a short advisory
opinion, Fla. Ethics Op. 93-3, concluding only that a lawyer who receives an inadvertent
disclosure of documents containing confidential information about an opponent is ethically
obligated to notify opposing counsel of the fact of receipt, but leaving any further action up
to the lawyers involved.
87. Subdivision (e) of RPC 4-3.4, "Fairness of Opposing Party and Counsel," provides
that a lawyer shall not:
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is
relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.4(e).
88. 641 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
89. "It is exasperating that, no matter how many times appellate courts cite this wellknown rule [RPC 4-3.4(e)], trial counsel and trial judges do not seem to get the message."
Id. at 430.
90. Id.
91. 655 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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statement, not supported by evidence, as to what other chiropractors have
done. 92
The First District Court of Appeal weighed in with its decision in
Sacred HeartHospital of Pensacolav. Stone.93 The court reversed on the
basis of repeated argument in violation of RPC 4-3.4(e) and remanded for
a new trial, despite the fact that most of the improper argument had not
been objected to at trial.9 4 Improper comments included statements of
personal opinion by plaintiffs counsel (e.g., that the defense's theory of
fault was "ridiculous" and that one defendant presented "ridiculous"
testimony), references to matters outside the record (e.g., a comment
concerning alleged lying by an expert witness), and an invitation by
plaintiff's counsel in closing argument to deal harshly with defendants. 95
Finally, during the past year the supreme court promulgated two rules
affecting a lawyer's ethical obligations in the trial setting. In amending RPC
4-3.4(b), the court specified the types of payments that ethically may be
made by counsel to witnesses. 96 Lawyers may reasonably compensate
witnesses for expenses actually incurred, or compensation actually lost, by
virtue of appearing as a witness in a proceeding. The second rule amendment concerned what a lawyer permissibly may say about the lawyer's
pending case in public, extrajudicial statements. Not inspired by the
Simpson debacle, this change to RPC 4-3.69' actually resulted from the

92. Id at 1219.
93. 650 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 659 So. 2d 1089 (1995).
94. Id. at 681.

at 680.
95. lad
96. Amended subdivision (b)of RPC 4-3.4, "Fairness of Opposing Party and Counsel,"
provides that a lawyer shall not:
(b) fabricate evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an
inducement to a witness, except a lawyer may pay a witness reasonable expenses
incurred by the witness in attending or testifying at proceedings; a reasonable,
noncontingent fee for the professional services of an expert witness; and
reasonable compensation to reimburse a witness for the loss of compensation
incurred by reason of preparing for, attending, or testifying at proceedings.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.4(b).
97. Amended RPC 4-3.6, '"Trial Publicity," provides:
(a) Prejudicial Extrajudicial Statements Prohibited. A lawyer shall not make
an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding due to its creation of an imminent and substantial
detrimental effect on that proceeding.

240
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decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gentile v. State Bar
of Nevada.98 Although intended to delete the "safe harbor" language in the
prior version of the rule that was held to be unconstitutionally vague in
Gentile,99 the amended version of RPC 4-3.6 still provides only the most
general guidance to a lawyer searching for the limits of what he or she may
say publicly about a pending case. Lawyers, however, may take some
comfort in the fact that there have been no reported Florida cases in which
a bar member was disciplined for violating the trial publicity rule.
IV. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAWYER'S
RELATIONSHIP WITH THIRD PARTIES

A lawyer's professional relationships, of course, extend beyond dealing
with clients and courts. The RPC interpose minimum ethical standards into
many of a lawyer's relationships with third parties. During the past year,
a number of decisions affected lawyers' relationships with persons and
entities such as prospective clients, opposing parties, other lawyers,
employers, employees, and the legal system.
The most significant lawyer advertising and solicitation decision in
years was rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc."° A lawyer and a for-profit lawyer referral
service challenged Florida's RPC 4-7.4(b)(1)(A), l0' which requires that

(b) Statements of Third Parties. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another
person to make such a statement. Counsel shall exercise reasonable care to
prevent investigators, employees, or other persons assisting in or associated with
a case from making extrajudicial statements that are prohibited under this rule.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.6.
98. 501 U.S. 1030, 1047 (1991).
99. Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 644 So. 2d 282,
283 (Fla. 1994).
100. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
101. Subdivision (b)(1)(A) of RPC 4-7.4, "Direct Contact with Prospective
Clients," provides:
(b) Written Communication.
(1) A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on the
lawyer's behalf or on behalf of the lawyer's firm or partner, an associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional
employment if:
(A) the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or
wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the
person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person,
unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing
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Florida lawyers wait for at least thirty days following an accident or disaster
before sending targeted direct mail solicitation letters concerning personal
injury, wrongful death, or other actions relating to the accident or disaster
to accident victims or their families. This prohibition extends to lawyer
referral services under RPC 4-7.8(a)(1). 102
The court upheld the thirty-day waiting period rule after analyzing it
under the three-prong commercial speech test"3 articulated in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York."° First, the Court agreed that the Florida Bar has "substantial
interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility" of potential recipients
against invasive, unsolicited contact by lawyers and in preventing the
erosion of public confidence in the legal profession that such conduct
engenders.'0 5 Second, the Bar effectively demonstrated that the challenged
rule advances these interests in a direct and material way. 6 The Bar
presented unrebutted evidence, both empirical and anecdotal, showing that
both targeted harms are real. Third, the Court concluded that the thirty-day
waiting period was a restriction "reasonably well-tailored" to achieve the
desired objectives.1 7 Went For It, Inc. was the first case since commercial speech protection was extended to lawyer advertising in Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona' to uphold a state's restrictions on lawyer advertising.
Undoubtedly this decision will inspire bar organizations around the country
to reexamine lawyer advertising and advertising regulations within their
jurisdictions.
Virtually all lawyers are aware that RPC 4-4.2'09 prohibits them from

of the communication.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-7.4(b)(1)(A).
102. Subdivision (a)(1) of RPC 4-7.8, "Lawyer Referral Services," provides:
(a) When Lawyers May Accept Referrals. A lawyer shall not accept referrals

from a lawyer referral service unless the service:
(1)engages in no communication with the public and in no direct contact
with prospective clients in a manner that would violate the Rules of Professional
R.

Conduct if the communication or contact were made by the lawyer.
4-7.8(a)(1).

REGULATING FLA. BAR

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2381.
447 U.S. 557, 568-71 (1980).
Went For It,
Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
Id. at 2378.
Id. at 2380.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).

109. RPC 4-4.2, "Communication with Person Represented by Counsel," provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another
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communicating with a represented person concerning the subject of the
representation, unless the other person's lawyer consents. Difficulties often
arise, however, when a lawyer who represents a client against a corporate
entity attempts to apply this rule to possible contacts with current or former
employees of the opposing entity. The Professional Ethics Committee
concluded, in Florida Ethics Opinion 88-14, that it is not unethical for a
lawyer to contact former employees of a represented opponent, provided the
lawyer does not inquire into matters protected by the attorney-client
privilege."o But Florida lawyers must be aware that courts, both state and
federal, are moving to limit the broad range of action otherwise afforded by
Opinion 88-14.
In Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of America,"' a lawyer represented
a person who allegedly suffered damages while staying in a nursing home
operated by the defendant corporation. Upon motion by the defendant, the
trial court entered an order forbidding plaintiff's counsel from any ex parte
communication with former employees of the nursing home who cared for
or treated the plaintiff. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed this
order, taking care to note that the order was limited in scope-it did not bar
ex parte contact with all former employees, but only contact with "the very

lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attorney may, without such prior consent,
communicate with another's client in order to meet the requirements of any
statute or contract requiring notice or service of process directly on an adverse
party, in which event the communication shall be strictly restricted to that
required by statute or contract, and a copy shall be provided to the adverse
party's attorney.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-4.2. The Comment to RPC 4-4.2 goes on to explain, in
pertinent part:
In the case of an organization, this rule prohibits communications by a lawyer
for 1 party concerning the matter in representation with persons having a
managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization and with any other person
whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may
constitute an admission on the part of the organization. If an agent or employee
of the organization is represented in the matter by the agent's or employee's own
counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for
purposes of this rule.
Id. 4-4.2 cmt.
110. Fla. Ethics Op. 88-14, reprinted in PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE FLA. BAR (2d
ed.) at 1302. This opinion was approved by the Florida Bar Board of Governors on March
7, 1989. Id. at 1299.
111. 656 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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'
persons whose actions or inactions form the basis for the complaint."112
Therefore, the order precluded contact with former nursing home employees
who cared for or treated the plaintiff, since their actions or inactions form
the basis of the defendant's alleged liability. In a footnote, the court
specified that "there is no restriction on contact with former employees who
were merely witnesses to the care of [the plaintiff].'. 3
A federal court sitting in Florida also rendered a decision concerning
ex parte contact with former employees of an organizational opponent. In
United States v. Florida Cities Water Co., 114 lawyers for the government
sought an order allowing them ex parte contacts with the defendant
corporation's former employees. The court denied the motion, concluding
that the corporation's demonstrated interest in protecting privileged
information required the government to provide the corporation's counsel
with notice and opportunity to attend the government's interviews of former
corporate employees.'
Both Barfuss and Florida Cities Water Co. must be considered by
Florida lawyers contemplating ex parte contacts with former employees of
an opposing party. It may be noted, however, that these cases rely upon the
debatable decision handed down by the Middle District in Rentclub v.
TransamericaRental Finance Corp."6 In Rentclub, a law firm that hired
the former chief financial officer of a division of the opposing corporation
as a paid "trial consultant" was disqualified from further participation in the
case based upon the "consultant's" possession of privileged information
about the corporate opponent and upon the appearance of impropriety. The
court defined organizational party for purposes of the communication rule
as including: "1) managerial employees, 2) any other persons whose acts or
omissions in connection with the matter at issue may be imputed to the
corporation for liability, and 3) persons whose statements constitute
admissions by the corporation.""..7 Cases following Rentclub may be
building upon a shaky premise, however, because it is quite clear from a
close reading of both the trial court and appellate court opinions that the

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 488-89.
Id. at 489 n.5.
No. 93-281-CIV-FTM-21, 1995 WL 340980 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 1995).
Id. at *3.
811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla. 1992), af.f'd, 43 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 657.
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decisions were greatly influenced by the fact that the former employee
' 8
received a substantial sum as payment for his work as a "consultant."
Contact with unrepresented opposing parties was the subject of Florida
Ethics Opinion 94-4."9 The Professional Ethics Committee concluded
"that [o]pposing counsel may communicate with an individual who is
litigating pro se concerning that litigation even though [a lawyer] is
representing the individual in a related matter. Opposing counsel, however,
matter of the
may not communicate with the individual about the subject
' 20
consent."'
[lawyer]'s
the
without
representation
[lawyer]'s
Much of a lawyer's time is spent dealing with other lawyers, and
several 1995 Professional Ethics Committee opinions addressed ethical
issues arising in these relationships. Florida Ethics Opinion 94-7121
provided the''answer to the long-open question of whether lawyers who are
"of counsel 22 to one another are considered to be in the same firm, or
different firms, for purposes of the fee division rules (RPC 4-1.5(g) and
RPC 4-1.5(f)(4)(D)). 123 This question became especially pressing after the

118. The penultimate paragraph of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion states:
The district court found that the payment to Canales made it appear that Trenam,
Simmons had both induced Canales to disclose confidential matters relating to
Transamerica, in violation of Rules 4-1.6, 4-4.2 & 4-8.4(d) of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, as well as paid him for his factual testimony rather
than his work as a "trial consultant," in violation of Rules 4-8.4(c) & 4-8.4(d).
Rentclub, 811 F. Supp. at 654. We conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that there was the appearance of impropriety in the
payment to Canales. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's order.
Rentclub, 43 F.3d at 1440 (emphasis by italics added; emphasis by capitals in original).
119. FLA. B. NEws, Apr. 30, 1995, at 2.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The term "of counsel" may be used to describe a lawyer who maintains a close,
continuing relationship with another lawyer or law firm in a capacity other than that of a
partner or an associate. Fla. Ethics Op. 94-7, 75-41, 71-49. The relationship must be more
than a mere referral arrangement. Fla. Ethics Op. 72-29.
123. Subdivision (g) of RPC 4-1.5, "Fees for Legal Services," provides:
(g) Division of Fees Between Lawyers in Different Firms. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(D), a division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer;
or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the representation
and agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
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245

Supreme Court of Florida capped the amount of referral fee which a
referring lawyer could receive in a personal injury matter without prior
circuit court approval. 24 The committee decided that a lawyer "who is 'of
counsel' to a law firm is considered to be a member of that firm for
purposes of the fee-division rules only if that lawyer practices through that
firm exclusively."'"
Regarding another fee division issue, in Barwick Dillian & Lambert,
P.A. v. Ewing'26 the court held that the fee division provisions of the
ethics code did not apply in a situation in which an associate lawyer and the
employer law firm had agreed, during the associate's employment with the
(B) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be made and
the basis upon which the division of fees will be made.

R.

REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(g).

Subdivision (f)(4)(D) of RPC 4-1.5 provides:

(D) As to lawyers not in the same firm, a division of any fee within
subdivision (f)(4) [governing contingent fee personal injury matters] shall be on
the following basis:
(i) To the lawyer assuming primary responsibility for the legal services on
behalf of the client, a minimum of 75% of the total fee.
(ii) To the lawyer assuming secondary responsibility for the legal services
on behalf of the client, a maximum of 25% of the total fee. Any fee in excess
of 25% shall be presumed to be clearly excessive.
(iii) The 25% limitation shall not apply to those cases in which 2 or more
lawyers or firms accept substantially equal active participation in the providing
of legal services. In such circumstances counsel shall apply for circuit court
authorization of the fee division in excess of 25%, based upon a sworn petition
signed by all counsel that shall disclose in detail those services to be performed.
The application for authorization of such a contract may be filed as a separate
proceeding before suit or simultaneously with the filing of a complaint.
Proceedings thereon may occur before service of process on any party and this
aspect of the file may be sealed. Authorization of such contract shall not bar
subsequent inquiry as to whether the fee actually claimed or charged is clearly
excessive. An application under this subdivision shall contain a certificate
showing service on the client and The Florida Bar. Counsel may proceed with
representation of the client pending court approval.
(iv) The percentages required by this subdivision shall be applicable after
deduction of any fee payable to separate counsel retained especially for appellate
purposes.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(f)(4)(D).
124. This limitation, which restricts the share of the "secondary lawyer" to 25% of the
total fee, was adopted for all contracts entered into on or after January 1, 1988. Florida Bar
re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 519 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. 1987). The
limitation is currently set forth in subdivision (f)(4)(D) of RPC 4-1.5, "Fees for Legal
Services." See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(f)(4)(D).
125. Fla. Ethics Op. 94-7 (emphasis added).
126. 646 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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firm, that the associate would receive a certain percentage of the fees from
cases brought to the firm by the associate.127 However, the case in question was not concluded (and thus the fee was not received) by the firm until
after the associate's employment with the firm ended. Accordingly, the
court stated that, "[w]here, as here, [the associate's] sole claim is for
services rendered at the [employer] firm, we do not believe that a new, postdeparture set of agreements needed to be entered in order for [the associate]
128
to assert her claim."'
The rationale of Barwick was followed in Florida Ethics Opinion 941.129 In this opinion, the Professional Ethics Committee decided that an
agreement between a law firm and an associate lawyer employed by the firm
"concerning division of the fee from a case brought to the firm by the
[associate was] not subject to the rules governing fee divisions between
[lawyers] in different
firms when the [associate] leaves the firm before the
130
case is concluded."'
In contrast to the agreement at issue in Opinion 94-1, the fee division
provisions in the associate-law firm employment agreement under scrutiny
in hotly-contested 13' Florida Ethics Opinion 93-4132 were to be triggered
only if the associate left the firm and thereafter continued to work on
matters for "the Employer's clients." In addition to a requirement that the
departing associate pay the former firm "the greater of fifty percent (50%)
of any fee received from said client or the Firm's quantum meruit," the
agreement barred the associate from "seeking, directly or indirectly, any of
the Employer's clients" and from "inducing, either directly or indirectly, any
employee to quit or abandon the Employer."'133 The Committee concluded
that, when read as a whole, the employment agreement violated RPC 45.6(a),134 which prohibits a lawyer from offering or making a partnership
or employment agreement that restricts a lawyer's right to practice after

127. Id. at 779.
128. Id.
129. FLA. B. NEws, July 15, 1994, at 2.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Mark D. Killian, BoardApproves Employment-Agreement EthicsOpinion,
FLA. B. NEWS, Mar. 1, 1995, at 3.
132. Id. at 21.
133. Id.
134. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-5.6, "Restrictions on Right to Practice," provides that a
lawyer shall not participate in offering or making "(a) a partnership or employment
agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship,
except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement[.]" R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 45.6(a).
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termination of the relationship. The Committee opined that the offending
provisions created a substantial "financial disincentive" that would operate
to "preclude the departing [associate] from accepting representation of [firm]
clients," and
would impermissibly restrict the right of association among
1 35
lawyers.
RPC 4-5.6 is not the only ethical standard governing the relationship
between a law firm and its lawyer employees. A lawyer is obligated to deal
honestly with the firm that employs him or her. In FloridaBar v. Cox,'36
a lawyer was suspended for thirty days for engaging in unauthorized outside
employment against firm policy, willfully deceiving the firm about the
"moonlighting," and diverting some fees paid in these matters from the firm
137
to himself.
A lawyer's relationship with his or her nonlawyer employees could be
affected by an amendment to RPC 4-5.4,138 concerning division of legal
fees with nonlawyers. This revision clarifies the circumstances under which
135. Fla. Ethics Op. 93-4.
136. 655 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1995). Specifically, the lawyer was found guilty of violating
RPC 4-1.7(b) ("Conflict of Interest; General Rule"), RPC 4-4.1 ('Truthfulness in Statements
to Others"), and RPC 4-8.4(c) ("Misconduct"). Id. at 1122 n.1.
137. Id. at 1123.
138. Subdivisions (a) and (b) of RPC 4-5.4, "Professional Independence of a Lawyer,"
provide:
(a) Sharing Fees with Nonlawyers. A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal
fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate
may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after
the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to I or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a
deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of
the total compensation that fairly represents the services rendered by the
deceased lawyer;
(3) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, in accordance with the provisions of rule 4-1.17, pay to the
estate or other legally authorized representative of that lawyer the agreed upon
purchase price; and
(4) bonuses may be paid to nonlawyer employees based on their extraordinary efforts on a particular case or over a specified time period, provided that the
payment is not based on the generation of clients or business and is not
calculated as a percentage of legal fees received by the lawyer or law firm.
(b) Qualified Pension Plans. A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer
employees in a qualified pension, profit-sharing, or retirement plan, even though
the lawyer's or law firm's contribution to the plan is based in whole or in part
on a profit-sharing arrangement.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-5.4(a)-(b).

Nova Law Review

Vol. 20

a lawyer may pay a bonus to these employees. A bonus may be based on
the nonlawyer's "extraordinary efforts on a particular case or over a
specified time period, provided that the payment is not based on the
generation of clients or business and is not calculated as a percentage of
legal fees received by the lawyer or law firm."' 39 The supreme court thus
reaffirmed the principle that nonlawyers may not ethically be paid for
bringing in cases."4
Whether dealing with another lawyer over fees or other matters, a
lawyer may come to believe that a fellow lawyer has engaged in unethical
behavior. Regardless of the validity of this belief, however, the Professional
Ethics Committee stated in Florida Ethics Opinion 94-5 '41 that it ordinarily
is unethical to threaten to file a disciplinary complaint against another
lawyer. The committee reasoned that a lawyer is obligated under RPC 48.3142 to report serious misconduct on the part of other lawyers and,
accordingly, that to threaten not to file a report when otherwise required by
this rule would itself be unethical. Furthermore, even in situations in which
reporting is not required by RPC 4-8.3, the committee believed that
threatening to file a grievance complaint in order to obtain an advantage
from the other lawyer could be extortionate (thereby violating RPC 4-

139. Id. 4-5.4(a)(4).
140. See also RPC 4-7.2(q), "Advertising," which provides:
Payment for Recommendations; Lawyer Referral Services Fees. A lawyer shall
not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services,
except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising or written or
recorded communication permitted by these rules, may pay the usual charges of
a lawyer referral service or other legal service organization, and may purchase
a law practice in accordance with rule 4-1.17.
Id. 4-7.2(q).
141. FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 30, 1995, at 2.
142. RPC 4-8.3, "Reporting Professional Misconduct," provides in pertinent part:
(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. A lawyer having knowledge that
another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate professional
authority.
(c) Confidences Preserved. This rule does not require disclosure of information
otherwise protected by rule 4-1.6.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.3.
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249

8.4(b))143 or would constitute "conduct ...prejudicial to the administration of justice" (in violation of RPC 4-8.4(d)). 144
It follows that falsely accusing another lawyer of misconduct -is
unethical. In Florida Bar v. Adams,14 5 the supreme court so held and

suspended the lawyer for ninety days. 146 Finally, in two instances involving child support obligations the supreme court addressed the matter of a
lawyer's relationship with his or her children, and presumably with society
(in the event the failure to pay support implicates the state's public
assistance machinery). First, in Florida Bar v. Taylor,47 the court
declined to discipline a lawyer who had been held in contempt of a New
Hampshire court for failing to pay substantial child support arrearages 48
The supreme court took great care to distinguish between criminal contempt
and civil contempt, stating that under its then-existing rules it could
discipline lawyers for the former but, absent fraudulent or dishonest conduct,
had no authority to impose discipline for the latter. 49 Then, just a few
weeks after the Taylor decision, the court on its own motion promulgated
new RPC 4-8.4(h), making it unethical for a lawyer to "willfully refuse, as
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, to timely pay a child
support obligation.' ' 50

143. Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-8.4, "Misconduct," provides that a lawyer shall not
"(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness,
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects[.]" Id. 4-8.4(b).
144. Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-8.4, "Misconduct," provides that a lawyer shall not:
(d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous
indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors,
witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not
limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin,
disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status,
employment, or physical characteristic.
Id. 4-8.4(d).
145. 641 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1994).
146. Id. at 399.
147. 648 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1995).
148. Id,at 709.
149. Id. at 711.
150. The Comment to new RPC 4-8.4(h) expresses the court's view of the purpose
behind the rule and its intended application:
Subdivision (h) of this rule was added to make consistent the treatment of
attorneys who fail to pay child support with the treatment of other professionals
who fail to pay child support, in accordance with the provisions of section
61.13015, FloridaStatutes (1993). That section provides for the suspension or
denial of a professional license due to delinquent child support payments after
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DISCIPLINARY

CONTEXT
Looking at the bigger picture, it is apparent that the position in society
held by lawyers-trusted fiduciaries who are not only officers of the court,
but who in the minds of many personify our system of justice'l-justifies
the imposition of ethical obligations commensurate with this position. In
1995, the Supreme Court of Florida, the ultimate authority over the
admission to and practice of law in our state,15 imposed disciplinary
sanctions on a number of lawyers for a variety of offenses. This section of
the article briefly reviews some significant disciplinary cases not previously
discussed in parts II, III, or IV.
Initially, Florida lawyers should realize that, even in the absence of a
substantive rules violation, they are obligated to respond in writing to
accusations that are being investigated by the Florida Bar. Two rules, RPC
4-8.1151 and RPC 4-8.4(g), 54 impose this duty. In FloridaBar v. Grigs-

all other available remedies for the collection of child support have been
exhausted. Likewise, subdivision (h) of this rule should not be used as the
primary means for collecting child support, but should be used only after all
other available remedies for the collection of child support have been exhausted.
Before a grievance may be filed or a grievance procedure initiated under this
subdivision, the court that entered the child support order must first make a
finding of willful refusal to pay. The child support obligation at issue under this
rule includes both domestic (Florida) and out-of-state (URESA) child support
obligations, as well as arrearages.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.4(h) cmt.

151. See generally Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
152. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
153. Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-8.1, "Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters," provides:
An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar
admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the
person to have arisen in the matter or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful
demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that
this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule
4-1.6.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.1(b).
154. Subdivision (g) of RPC 4-8.4, "Misconduct," provides that a lawyer shall not
"(g) fail to respond, in writing, to any inquiry by a disciplinary agency when such agency
is conducting an investigation into the lawyer's conduct." Id. 4-8.4(g). The pertinent portion
of the Comment to RPC 4-8.4 explains:
A lawyer's obligation to respond to an inquiry by a disciplinary agency is stated
in subdivision (g) and rules 3-4.8 and 3-7.6(g)(2). While response is mandatory,
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by,155 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded and placed on three years'
probation for failing to respond to the Bar's investigative inquiries. 156 In
mitigation, it was noted that the lawyer had been suffering from clinical
depression.57 Such a mitigating factor apparently was not present in
58
because in that case a similar violation resulted
FloridaBar v. Grosso,"
in a ten-day suspension. 9
Similarly, a lawyer who willfully evades the Bar's attempts at service
faces disciplinary problems. In FloridaBar v. Hawkins,'6° a lawyer whom
the court allowed to resign in lieu of disciplinary action was later investigated for violating the terms of the resignation order. The lawyer avoided
five
service of an order to show cause, but nevertheless was disbarred for
61
service.
avoiding
as
well
as
order
resignation
the
years for violating
In the view of the supreme court, perhaps the two most serious offenses
are lying to a court and misappropriation of client funds. Both were present
in FloridaBar v. de la Puente.'62 In de la Puente, a lawyer who repeatedly used client trust funds for his own purposes, forged signatures on
checks in order to gain access to the funds, misrepresented information to
a court in a probate proceeding, fabricated evidence in the disciplinary
proceeding, and instructed a witness to lie, was disbarred for a minimum of
ten years. The court noted that, "[s]everal of these actions, when considered
alone, create a presumption that disbarment is the appropriate penal1 63

ty."

Another disciplinary case involving trust accounting violations is
FloridaBar v. Condon.'" In Condon, garden variety theft of client funds
resulted in a three-year suspension to be followed by a probationary

the lawyer may deny the charges or assert any available privilege or immunity
or interpose any disability that prevents disclosure of certain matter. A response
containing a proper invocation thereof is sufficient under the Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar. This obligation is necessary to ensure the proper and efficient
operation of the disciplinary system.

Id. 4-8.4(g) cmt.
155.
156.
157.
158.

641 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 1994).
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1342.
647 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1994).

159. Id. at 841.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

643 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1994).
Id. at 1075.
658 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1995).
Id. at 69.
647 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1994).
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period. 65 In Florida Bar v. Cramer,'" a lawyer violated trust accounting rules when he used his trust account in an apparent attempt to hide his
own funds from the Internal Revenue Service. 67 Although no client funds
were misappropriated, the court found that this attempt to mislead the IRS
amounted to conduct involving "dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation,"
68 In Florida Bar v. Mitchell,169
and imposed a ninety-day suspension.
commingling and other trust accounting violations netted a lawyer a ninetyday suspension, followed by a one-year probation. 7 ° There appeared to
be no loss of any client funds, but among other violations, the supreme court
found the lawyer guilty of failing to remit interest earned on his trust
account to the Florida Bar Foundation as required under the Interest on
Trust Accounts ("IOTA") program rules.' 7' Also of interest in this case
was the court's rejection of the lawyer's minority status as a mitigating
factor.'72 Finally, trust accounting violations coupled with the charging
of an excessive fee in a probate matter led to a ninety-day suspension in
Florida Bar v. Forrester.173 No theft occurred, but the lawyer moved
funds from her trust account to her operating account before they were
earned. In this case the court "expressly note[d] that we consider the
maintenance of contemporary and accurate trust account records to be
essential to public confidence that members of The Florida Bar are
maintaining these accounts pursuant to their fiduciary and ethical obliga174
tions."'
As in other years, 1995 saw no shortage of disciplinary actions as a
result of lawyers' involvement in criminal activity. In Florida Bar v.
Smith, 175 the court suspended a former Congressman for three years as a
result of felony convictions arising from income tax under-reporting and
violation of federal election laws. 176 The presence of a number of mitigating factors helped the lawyer avoid disbarment,'" the usual penalty for

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 824.
643 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1994).
Id. at 1070.
Id. at 1070-71.
645 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1994).
Id. at 416.
Id. at 415; see R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 5-1.1(e).
Id. at 416.
656 So. 2d 1273, 1276 (Fla. 1995).
Id.
650 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1995).
Id. at 982.
Id. at 981.
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such conduct. Disbarment did result from a lawyer's out-of-state criminal
178
convictions for grand larceny and conspiracy in FloridaBar v. Wilson.
A lawyer's involvement in criminal activity, even if he or she is not
convicted of a crime, can still result in discipline. For example, the court
disbarred a former circuit court judge caught in the Dade County "Operation
Courtbroom" investigation, for his participation in bribery and misconduct
while on the bench, in FloridaBar v. Davis.'79 Discipline was imposed
despite the fact that the lawyer had been acquitted of federal criminal
charges. It may be noted that the "clear and convincing" standard of proof
used in disciplinary proceedings is lower, and thus easier to meet, than the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applied in criminal cases. 180 In
Florida Bar v. Wheeler,'8 ' the supreme court disbarred a lawyer involved
in the "Operation Courtbroom" probe for his misconduct, even though he
avoided prosecution by testifying against fellow conspirators in exchange for
immunity. 2 In Florida Bar v. Marable," a lawyer expressed interest
in obtaining the fruits of what a law enforcement informant led him to
believe was a burglary." 4 In reality, the informant fabricated the story.
The court rejected the referee's finding that the lawyer had committed the
crime of solicitation of a burglary, but suspended the lawyer for sixty days
for his "unethical behavior in involving himself and' 5his client with the
products of what he believed to be criminal activity."'
Neglect of client matters continued to be a cause for disciplinary action.
6 a lawyer earned a suspension of ninety-one
In Florida Bar v. Daniel,"1
days, and thereafter until rehabilitation was proved, for repeatedly neglecting
client matters. 7 In Florida Bar v. Robinson, 88 however, mitigating
factors helped a lawyer receive a reprimand rather than suspension' 9
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

643 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 1994).
657 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1995).
See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Rayman, 238 So. 2d 594, 596-97 (Fla. 1970).
653 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1995).
Id. at 392.
645 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1994).

184. Id. at440
185. Id. at 443.
186. 641 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1994).
187. Id. at 1332. RPC 3-5.1(e), 'Types of Discipline," provides that: "A suspension
of 90 days or less shall not require proof of rehabilitation or passage of the Florida bar
examination. A suspension of more than 90 days shall require proof of rehabilitation and

may require passage of all or part of the Florida bar examination." R. REGULATING FLA.
BAR

3-5.1(e).
188. 654 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1995).

189. Id. at 555-56.
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Interestingly, the referee had recommended that the lawyer be ordered to
notify his clients of the reprimand. The supreme court declined to impose
this requirement."
A case of note in the area of fees is Florida Bar v. Garland.'9 In
Garland, the lawyer was charged with collecting an excessive fee in a
probate case, along with other misconduct such as trust accounting
violations and falsification of records. He paid himself almost $33,000 in
fees, while expert testimony in the case indicated that a reasonable fee
would have been between $15,000 and $18,000. Sometime after this
occurred, legislative amendments to the probate code concerning calculation
of reasonable fees to the personal representative and attorney of an estate
became effective. Surprisingly, the supreme court found the lawyer not
guilty of the excessive fee charge because "if the fee charged in this case
were charged today it likely would be considered reasonable under the new
19
statutory provisions.""
Thus, it appears that, if a lawyer has the good
fortune to do something that is improper under one rule and that rule is later
changed, the lawyer may escape discipline. This seems like an incongruous
result in view of the fact that lawyers are expected to conform their conduct
to the rules and laws in existence when the conduct occurs.
Knowingly providing a false affidavit to a bank to help a relative
secure a loan resulted in a sixty-day suspension for the lawyer in Florida
Bar v. Johnson. 93 The court stated that it "will not condone attorneys
making affidavits for submission to a lender or to any other person or
entity
' 94
which are in fact not true and correct as to the statements therein."'
In the past year, the court has also reaffirmed its willingness to impose
what may be termed "reciprocal discipline" upon Florida lawyers who are
disciplined by other jurisdictions in which they are admitted to practice law.
In FloridaBar v. Friedman, 95 a member of the Florida Bar was suspended from practice in another state. 96 Based on the suspension order from
the other state, the Supreme Court of Florida suspended the lawyer from
practice in Florida.' 97 The lawyer argued that Florida should not accept

190. Id. at 556.
191. 651 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1995).
192. Id. at 1184. Though not guilty of the excessive fee charge, the lawyer was found
guilty of other misconduct and suspended for two years. Id.
193. 648 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1994).
194. Id. at 682.
195. 646 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1707 (1995).
196. Id. at 189.
197. Id. at 190.
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the other state's suspension order because the other state's finding of guilt
was premised on a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, rather than the
"clear and convincing" test used in Florida. The supreme court rejected this
98
argument.'
A final noteworthy development in the disciplinary area was the
supreme court's adoption of a "Practice and Professionalism Enhancement
Program," commonly referred to as an "ethics school."199 This program
is intended to divert from the disciplinary system lawyers who have
committed minor transgressions and whose conduct, it is believed, could be
improved through education in basic ethics rules, law office management,
and interpersonal skills. No case in which the misconduct rises above the
level of minor misconduce' is eligible for diversion, and a lawyer who
has been the subject of a prior diversion within the past seven years is not
eligible.2 '
VI. CONCLUSION
Professional responsibility has become almost a "growth industry" in
recent years. Legal malpractice suits are becoming more common,
grievance complaints are being filed at record rates, and motions to
disqualify lawyers from trial representation have mushroomed. In fact, this
increased attention on the legal ethics field has led to the formation of a
national group for lawyers whose practices are concentrated in this area, the
Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers ("APRL"). Decisions
rendered during the past year by Florida courts and ethics committees
addressed a wide range of professional responsibility issues and must be
given careful consideration by the practicing lawyer. Failure to adhere to
the professional responsibility standards set forth in these decisions can have
serious consequences.

198. Id.
199. The new rule 3-5.3 was adopted in Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar, 644 So. 2d 282, 289-90 (Fla. 1994).
200. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(b).
201. Id. 3-5.1(c).

